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Abstract
Statistical analysis of networks plays a critical role in
the context of economics and the social sciences. Here
we construct a bidding network to represent the be-
havior of users of the eBay marketplace. We study the
eBay markets for digital cameras and liquid crystal dis-
play screens, and employ network analysis to identify
aggregate structure in bidder preferences. The network
that we construct associates auctions with nodes, and
weighted edges between nodes capture the number of
bidders competing in a pair of auctions, where said bid-
ders ultimately win in only a single auction. We show
that current community detection methods applied to
this network allow for the identiﬁcation of goods that
are considered substitutes and complements, and thus
the identiﬁcation of aggregate preference information.
In closing we suggest additional opportunities as well
as challenges for the analysis of structured data in elec-
tronic markets.
Introduction
As technology enables the collection of ever more vast
and diverse data sets, methods of unsupervised learn-
ing continue to grow in importance. Nowhere is this
more readily apparent than in modern-day e-commerce
networks, where the burgeoning study of behavior and
preferences continues to gain in importance (Bapna
2004; Reichardt & Bornholdt 2005; Shah et al. 2003;
Yang et al. 2003). However, the mathematical and
statistical models and methodologies to support these
studies lag signiﬁcantly behind at present; existing al-
gorithms do not allow researchers to ask and answer
the new scientiﬁc questions engendered by these mod-
ern data types.
In particular, such data sets typically exhibit rela-
tional and temporal structure spanning a variety of
scales. Here we consider a data set derived from the
eBay online auction site. We collect information about
the bidder activity in two markets, namely the market
for branded digital cameras and the market for liquid
Copyright c  2007, American Association for Artiﬁcial In-
telligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
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crystal display (LCD) screens. From this information
we extract relational data by looking for bidders who
participate in multiple auctions. This provides a net-
work representation of the market, in which auctions
are associated with nodes, and weighted edges between
nodes capture the number of bidders competing in a
pair of auctions, where said bidders ultimately win in
only a single auction.
Given such a “bidding network,” we adopt commu-
nity detection algorithms to identify aggregate prefer-
ence information. Our main idea is that behavioral in-
formation about bidders can provide, in the aggregate,
information about which auctions’ goods are viewed
as substitutes and which auctions’ goods are viewed
as complements. We demonstrate that community de-
tection methods applied to this network can identify
substitutes and complements goods, and thus aggre-
gate preference information about the bidder popula-
tion. We close with a discussion about the need for
principled, Bayesian-inference based methods to study
the structure of behavioral data in economic contexts.
The Problem: Aggregate Preference
Identiﬁcation
A central problem in the analysis of economic systems
is to identify the preferences of the actors within the
economy. Armed with information about preferences,
one can then study both the allocative eﬃciency of mar-
ket institutions, as well as propose new institutions in
order to improve market eﬃciency. We are interested
in methods that can be leveraged to provide robust in-
formation about common structure in user preferences.
Speciﬁcally, on eBay we are interested in the following
two questions:
• Can substitutes goods be automatically identiﬁed
from bidder behavior?
• Can complements goods be automatically identiﬁed
from bidder behavior?
Roughly, two items are substitutes if a typical bid-
der with value for one item also has value for the other
item.1 Examples of substitutes goods include two mod-
1A more technical deﬁnition can be provided, wherebyels of 19” LCD monitors. Two items are complements
if a typical bidder has superadditive value for the pair
of items (and the demand for one item might fall if the
price on the other item increases.) Examples of com-
plements goods include a digital camera and a memory
stick, or a ﬂight and matching hotel rooms.
This macro-level, structural information on the pref-
erences of participants in a marketplace can be useful
for a number of reasons. For instance:
• Knowledge of goods that are natural substitutes, or
complements, can inﬂuence the design of user inter-
faces;
• Manufacturers can learn from revealed preference in-
formation about the products that are viewed as sub-
stitutes in the marketplace;
• In complex markets, it can be useful to pre-bundle
complements (and sometimes substitutes; e.g., in the
case of information goods) to improve revenue and/or
eﬃciency properties and simplify elicitation;
• Such knowledge can also be used to enhance cross-
selling (in the case of complements); e.g., attempting
to sell digital memory in addition to a camera.
The question of substitutes is also in part motivated
by the related problem of categorization: eBay has mil-
lions of widely varying items—for example, antiques,
cars, real estate, and electronics, among others—so
what is a scalable way to organize these items into
categories? Categorization has been shown to have a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on monthly sales (Lohse &
Spiller 1998), and an important part of the success of
eBay (Weiss, Capozzi, & Prusak 2004). Indeed, items
with precise categories tend to attract more bidder traf-
ﬁc (Hahn 2001), and allows for search via category-
speciﬁc parameters (McGuinness 2001), such as size,
model and brand.
Related Work
In application domains, the analysis of social networks
is well established (Wasserman & Faust 1994); recent
work has begun to focus on model-based clustering for
these networks (Handcock, Raftery, & Tantrum 2007).
A number of other studies also treat classiﬁcation and
clustering in relational data (Taskar, Segal, & Koller
2001; Kemp, Griﬃths, & Tenenbaum 2004). However,
to the best of our knowledge, the application of such
techniques to the economic analysis of electronic mar-
kets is a very recent development.
Community detection in networks is a growing area of
research because it can help to reveal underlying struc-
ture (Palla et al. 2005). For example, Flake et al. (Flake
et al. 2002) found that web pages tend to cluster into
communities of semantically similar pages; community
structure has also been examined in social and biologi-
cal networks (Girvan & Newman 2002).
preferences satisfy gross substitutes if the demand for one
of the items does not decrease when the price of the other
item increases (Lehmann, Lehmann, & Nisan 2001).
The empirical study of Internet auctions is a rela-
tively new ﬁeld, and most work has been done in the
past ﬁve years. This fact is not too surprising, since on-
line auction websites have only reached prominence re-
cently. To our knowledge, no prior work has addressed
the questions of identifying natural substitutes or natu-
ral complements amongst the goods in the eBay market.
The closest related work is a study of bidder commu-
nities on eBay (Reichardt & Bornholdt 2005), which we
believe to be the ﬁrst study of communities in a network
generated from an online auction site.2 The authors
logged all data over a 12-day period on the German
eBay.de website. They then generated a network with
bidders as nodes and edges drawn between any two bid-
ders who bid in the same auction. Next, they applied a
community detection algorithm to the network. They
found 7 “major” communities and noted that these
communities tended to correspond to auctions in spe-
ciﬁc eBay-deﬁned high-level goods categories. For ex-
ample, one community consisted of bidders who primar-
ily participated in the Toy Models and Toy categories.
From these data, they concluded that bidders tend to
limit their activities to general categories of goods. We
ask diﬀerent questions in our work (i.e., whether one
can identify aggregate preference structure for speciﬁc
goods within a category), and construct a diﬀerent net-
work to represent the eBay market.
From eBay to Bidding Networks
In this section we describe how we construct a bidding
network from eBay data.
eBay Auction Data
We collect data by searching closed listings on
eBay.com. We have developed harvesting scripts writ-
ten in Perl to “scrape” eBay data, which is then stored
in a Mysql database.3 The information in the data set
is multi-faceted and includes the following elements for
each auction:
1. Title of auction, name of seller, type of auction, re-
serve price, reputation of seller.
2. Whether or not the item sold. The high bid in the
auction, and the start and end time.
3. The name of each bidder, the time the bid was placed
(to the bidder proxy) and the value of each bid.4
In addition, for the two eBay markets that we have
studied we have collected descriptive information, in-
cluding technology, brand information, etc. from an on-
line source.
2Personal communication, M. E. J. Newman.
3These scripts were ﬁrst developed in a classroom setting
by co-author Parkes, and were subsequently improved by
Aaron Roth.
4We do not have information on the value submitted by
the winning bidder to her proxy, only a lower bound on this
via the closing price.We collected data from two categories of goods.
The ﬁrst set (Canon) contains all auctions matching
“Canon” in the Digital Cameras category over a pe-
riod from Jan. 10, 2006 to Jan. 25, 2006. The sec-
ond set (LCD) contains all auctions matching “LCD”
in the Monitors and Projectors category over a period
from Nov. 29, 2005 to Dec. 14, 2005. These markets
were chosen because they are reasonably sized markets
where there might be natural substitutes (speciﬁc mod-
els of cameras and speciﬁc sizes, brands, or models of
LCDs).5
The Canon set consisted of 6717 auctions, and the
LCD set consisted of 11782 auctions. Similarly to Yang
et al. (Yang et al. 2003), we found for both data sets
that the distribution on the number of auctions in which
a bidder participates appeared to follow a power law.
In the Canon market, 8453 of the 12759 bidders (66%)
participated in only one auction, and 2065 (16%) par-
ticipated in only two. In the LCD market, 15650 of
the 23801 bidders (66%) participated in only one auc-
tion, and 3883 (16%) participated in only two. A small
number of bidders thus account for a disproportionate
amount of bidding activity. The maximum numbers of
auctions participated in by a single bidder were 61 and
171 for the Canon and LCD markets, respectively. The
bidder who participated in 171 auctions in the LCD
market averaged more than 12 per day!
Constructing a Bidding Network
Following data collection, we construct a graph to rep-
resent the semantic information about goods that is
revealed through bidder behavior: auctions are nodes
and an edge is drawn between an two auctions that
share a common bidder. Thus, an edge conveys infor-
mation about preferences: if one restricts edges to those
that represent bidders that eventually win a single item
then the presence of bidding across auctions provides re-
vealed preference, in this case indicating that the items
in the associated auctions are substitutes.
Preprocessing techniques are applied as follows in or-
der to emphasize structure and remove noise due to
extremal bidding behaviors: edges are weighted by the
number of shared bidders in any two auctions; and edge
weights due to bidders with bids less than some frac-
tion f (e.g., 0.8) of the winning price in one or both of
the auctions are removed. This proved important; for
instance, the 171-auction bidder in the LCD data set,
who represented less than 0.02% of the bidder popula-
tion, was found to generate more than 10% of the graph
edges. We do not want the community structure in our
network to be dominated by any one bidder.
As an illustration of the resulting network, Figure 1
shows a spring-model energy-minimization representa-
tion of the largest maximally connected component of
the Canon bidding network (for f = 0.8).
5Note that these market choices deﬁne our set of possible
substitutes for the purposes of this study, as we can only
determine substitutes on which users bid.
Figure 1: Largest maximally connected component of
the Canon bidding network, derived from eBay data
Community Detection Methods
We apply a current, state-of-the-art community detec-
tion algorithm to this graph.
What is a Community?
Informally, a community is described as a subset of
nodes that are connected more strongly to each other
than to the rest of the network. For example, a social
network of all university students in a locale, with edges
deﬁned by friendships, might naturally have communi-
ties deﬁned along college lines.
To this end, one formal deﬁnition of a community
is as follows (Reichardt & Bornholdt 2004): Given a
graph G with N nodes and M edges, a community of n
nodes and m edges is one satisfying 2m
n(n−1) > 2M
N(N−1) >
mnN
n(N−n), where mnN is the number of edges connect-
ing the community to the rest of the network. Each
of these terms represents a normalized edge density—
the number of edges divided by the maximum num-
ber of edges possible (if the nodes were connected as
a clique). The ﬁrst inequality requires that within-
community density be greater than the average network
density, while the second inequality requires that the
average network density be greater than the density of
edges leaving the community. Loosely, a community
should have a dense number of edges within the com-
munity and a sparse number of edges connecting it with
the rest of the network.Finding a Good Community Structure
For a given graph G = (V,E), where |V | = N and
|E| = M, the community detection problem can be
formalized as a partitioning problem subject to a con-
straint. Each v ∈ V should be assigned to some par-
tition ci, for i ∈ {1,2,...,nc} where nc is the number
of communities. We want this partitioning to match
our intuition as to what a good community is—that is,
the partitions should satisfy some deﬁnition of commu-
nity and/or maximize some metric that assesses a pro-
posed community partitioning. The community detec-
tion problem is diﬃcult because there may be multiple
ways to divide any graph into acceptable communities,
and furthermore, the number of “optimal” communities
is often not known beforehand.
Modularity is a global metric that has been widely
used to compare diﬀerent community divisions and de-
termine an “optimal” one (Newman 2004), and is de-
ﬁned as follows. Let eii be the fraction of all edges
in the graph that lie within community i, and let
ai = 1
2M
P
v∈ci dv, where dv is the degree of node v,
denote the fraction of ends of edges in the graph that
are in community i. Then the modularity Q(G,c) of
a graph and given community division c is deﬁned as
Q(G,c) =
P
i(eii−ai
2). This represents the fraction of
edges in the network that fall within communities less
the expected value of the fraction of edges in the net-
work that fall within communities given the number of
ends of edges in each community and if the edges had
been assigned uniformly at random.
Adopting shorthand Q for this modularity metric,
a value of Q = 0 indicates no community structure,
while a value of Q approaching the maximum of 1 rep-
resents the presence of strong community structure.6
Newman (Newman 2004) found that real world net-
works with strong community structure tend to have Q
values of at least 0.3. The highest known value of Q
in the literature for an unweighted real-world network
is Q = 0.75, which came from a reviewer network from
Amazon.com (Clauset, Newman, & Moore 2004).7
Having adopted this metric, we are now prepared to
identify communities in a network. Given the largest
maximally connected component of a network, we wish
to ﬁnd a community division that maximizes Q for this
component. Since the number of possible partitions is
exponential in the number of nodes, Newman (New-
man 2004) propose a greedy forward-selection method
(“Greedy Q”) where one starts with each node in its
own community and iteratively joins communities based
on the greatest increase in Q. This method has been
6In practice, it is possible to generate networks and com-
munity assignments where Q < 0. Furthermore, for any
given network, it may be impossible to attain Q = 1. In
earlier work, Newman (Newman 2003) normalized the value
of Q; however, he argues that the unnormalized Q is more
informative (Newman 2004).
7In fact, we found Q values of 0.72 in the LCD eBay
market and 0.77 in the Canon eBay market—higher even
than the modularity reported in the literature for Amazon.
Figure 2: Network community assignments in the LCD
bidding network, with colors and labels indicating nodal
community membership
demonstrated to reliably identify communities in both
artiﬁcial networks and real-world networks, and can be
further optimized for computational eﬃciency (Clauset,
Newman, & Moore 2004).
Figure 2 demonstrates the results of applying this
algorithm to a subset of 10% the eBay LCD market,
with nodes shown as auctions and edges drawn between
any two auctions that share a common bidder.
Results: Substitutes Preferences
For each of our markets—Canon and LCD—we gen-
erated a network that used both price threshold edge
ﬁltering (at f = 0.8) and edge weighting, and applied
our solution. We applied keyword extraction8 to the
communities and examined the keywords. We ﬁrst dis-
cuss results for the Canon market, and then turn to the
LCD market.
Canon Digital Cameras
Figure 3 illustrates the result of applying the methodol-
ogy described above to our digital camera data set. The
size of each circle is proportional to the number of auc-
tions in each community, and signiﬁcant keywords are
listed in order (with the most over-represented ﬁrst).
For the Canon market with both edge ﬁltering and
edge weighting, there were 25 communities ranging in
size from 3 to 339. Of these, 15 were major communi-
ties.9 Twelve of the major communities had signiﬁcant
8We use a simple statistical method to extract keywords
to describe a collection of auctions (Jin 2006), looking for
words that are both widely shared and over-represented, in
the sense of TF/IDF methods (Salton & Buckley 1988).
9We deﬁne a major community as one with at least 1% of
the total auctions in the maximally connected component.Figure 3: Proportionally sized Canon “substitutes” communities, with 0.8 edge thresholding and weighted edges
keywords, with a range of 1 to 6 signiﬁcant keywords
per community. The ﬁgure illustrates these 12 most
signiﬁcant communities. Ten of these communities had
exactly one camera model keyword (sd500, a620, s2,
a70, a520, s50, sd200, s80, s410, s110) and two commu-
nities had two camera keywords (sd400 and sd450; pro1
and g6). These are natural substitutes: the sd400 is the
predecessor to the sd450, and the two camera models
are extremely similar—they share the same resolution
and memory card, with the major diﬀerence being a
slightly larger screen on the sd450;10 the pro1 and g6
are 2 of the 6 “high-end” Powershot digital cameras that
Canon oﬀers and both take the same type of compact
ﬂash memory card.11
LCD Screens
For the LCD market, we identiﬁed 42 communities
ranging in size from 3 to 973. Of these, 12 were ma-
jor communities. Ten of the major communities had
signiﬁcant keywords, with a range of 1 to 7 signiﬁ-
cant keywords per community; these 10 communities
10One review (www.dpreview.com/reviews/canonsd450/)
termed the sd450 a “fairly minor upgrade” to the sd400.
11Information obtained from the oﬃcial Canon Powershot
website (www.powershot.com).
are shown in Figure 4. Eight of these 10 communities
had a size (15”, 17”, 19”, 20”, 24”) and/or a speciﬁc
model number (e173fp, 2005fpw, 2405fpw) as a key-
word. Importantly, no communities had more than one
size or more than one model number. This property
is desirable because it is unlikely that diﬀerent sizes or
models of monitors serve as good substitutes.
The communities are not quite as distinct as in the
Canon market—for example, there are two communities
with e173fp as a keyword, and also two communities
with 15” as a keyword. Thus, there is some evidence of
over-segmentation. Nonetheless, when taken together,
the keywords for the 12 major communities do seem
to encapsulate the signiﬁcant areas of the market—for
example, all major monitor sizes are represented in at
least one of the major communities.
An interesting anecdote is that examining the indi-
vidual auctions in the LCD community corresponding
to 24” 2405fpw Dell monitors (community 6 in Figure 4)
revealed one case where our method correctly grouped
an auction with similar other auctions even though the
seller had listed it in an incorrect category. In this case,
the seller listed the item in the 19-inch Dell monitor
category, but our method nonetheless grouped it with
other 24” monitors of the same model.Figure 4: Proportionally sized LCD “substitutes” com-
munities, with 0.8 edge thresholding and weighted edges
Results: Complements
With respect to complements goods, we assume that
buying goods together is evidence of complementarity.
Complementary goods can occur in sets larger than two,
but as a starting point, we only consider pairs of goods.
To study complementarity, we collected two addi-
tional data sets. The ﬁrst set consists of all auctions
matching “Secure Digital” in the Secure Digital (SD)
memory card category over a given time period. The
second set consists of all auctions matching “Compact
Flash” in the Compact Flash (CF) memory card cate-
gory. (These additional data sets shared the same time
period as our Canon data set.)
It seems reasonable that memory cards and cameras
have complementary relationships. Furthermore, diﬀer-
ent models of camera require speciﬁc formats of memory
cards—either CF or SD. Thus, we can assess the eﬀec-
tiveness of our methods by comparing the strength of
complementary relationships detected for each camera
model and the two types of memory cards. Out of the
12 signiﬁcant camera communities from the previous
section, 7 are SD cameras and 5 are CF cameras.
Our approach was two stage: ﬁrst we identiﬁed (sub-
stitutes) communities of interest, and then constructed
a new graph in which these communities of interest are
nodes, and edges are weighted to indicate the number
of distinct winners that submit competitive bids (ac-
cording to some threshold fraction of the winning bid)
in auctions that fall into the two communities.
Figure 5: Density plot of complementarity between dig-
ital camera and memory card communities (SD: secure
digital, CF: compact ﬂash) in the Canon eBay market.
Brighter boxes indicate higher complementarities
We need a method to evaluate the strength of the
complementary relationship between two communities
of goods c1 and c2. Intuitively, if the two communities
have a large number of shared winning bidders, then
it is likely that they have high complementarity. We
deﬁne comp(c1,c2) as:
comp(c1,c2) = max{cpct(c1,c2),cpct(c2,c1)} (1)
where cpct(a,b) is the number of distinct winning bid-
ders in a that also win at least one auction in b, divided
by the total number of distinct winning bidders in a.
For cases where there are few shared winning bidders,
we deﬁne compT(c1,c2) as:
compT(c1,c2) = max{cpctT(c1,c2),cpctT(c2,c1)} (2)
where cpctT(a,b) is the number of distinct winning bid-
ders in a that also place a bid that is at least a fraction
T of the closing price of an auction in b, divided by the
total number of distinct winning bidders in a. Note that
comp1(c1,c2) is essentially equivalent to comp(c1,c2)—
the only diﬀerence is that comp1(c1,c2) includes bids
that tied the closing price but lost.
We examined compT(c1,c2) for 14 communities,
twelve of which were camera communities. In addition,
we generated one CF community and one SD commu-
nity. Each of the memory card communities contained
a random 10% sample of successfully sold auctions in
their respective markets.12 Figure 5 displays the com-
12We did not generate substitute communities for the
memory card markets, as we simply wanted to test for com-
plements between cameras and card types in general.Figure 6: 14 × 14 Density plot for comp1(c1,c2)
(brighter boxes indicate a higher value)
plement function values for the CF and SD memory
card communities in relation to the camera communi-
ties. Most of the values for comp1(c1,c2) are 0—that
is, there were no shared winners between most of the
community pairs. For 4 of the 7 secure digital camera
communities, there was a nonzero comp1(c1,c2) value
between the camera community and the secure digi-
tal community. For 1 of the 5 compact ﬂash camera
communities, there was a nonzero comp1(c1,c2) value
between the camera community and the compact ﬂash
community. There were no false positives.
We next assessed whether we could identify more as-
sociations by relaxing the threshold. At the least re-
strictive value of T, comp0(c1,c2), the function is able
to associate 3 more camera communities with their
correct memory card type. In the process, however,
one compact ﬂash camera community is potentially
misclassiﬁed, since it has similar comp0(c1,CF) and
comp0(c1,SD) values.
The data also suggest that there is some between-
camera-community complementarity—that is, there are
bidders who win multiple cameras from diﬀerent com-
munities. Figure 6 depicts the full 14 × 14 density plot
for comp1(c1,c2). As we see, only 2 of the 4 camera
communities with memory card comp1(c1,c2) relation-
ships had their strongest comp1(c1,c2) value with the
memory card community. The other two communities
had stronger complement relationships with another
camera community.
As we decrease T, the between-camera-community
values of compT(c1,c2) begin to dwarf the camera-
memory card values of compT(c1,c2). This fact be-
comes evident in Figure 7, which depicts a 14×14 den-
sity plot for comp0(c1,c2). While 8 of the 12 camera
Figure 7: 14 × 14 Density plot for comp0(c1,c2)
(brighter boxes indicate a higher value)
communities are associated with the correct memory
card type, none of these relationships had the highest
value of comp0(c1,c2) for their row. Thus, while re-
laxing compT(c1,c2) can result in the identiﬁcation of
more associations, there are trade-oﬀs in increased mis-
classiﬁcation and noise.
Interestingly, stronger complementarity seems to ex-
ist between secure digital cameras and secure digital
cards than between compact ﬂash cameras and com-
pact ﬂash cards. Further investigation is needed to de-
termine if this is due to an intrinsic property of the
goods, or is rather a by-product of our choice of metric.
Looking Forward: Generative Modeling
and Bayesian Inference
A criticism of the methods that we have explored in
this work is that they are ad hoc. One ﬁrst proposes a
network to capture some underlying semantic property
via community structure, and then applies a community
detection algorithm without resort to an explicit model.
Following the recent directions of Kemp and New-
man (Kemp et al. 2006; Newman & Leicht 2007), a
more promising approach seems to be one of combin-
ing generative modeling with Bayesian inference. One
deﬁnes a generative model that allows for particular
relational structure between objects (e.g., between bid-
ders and auctions) and is also stochastic. This in turn
induces a graph whose edges, weights, and other pa-
rameters are considered to be random variables from
an appropriately chosen probability distributions. A
number of ﬁtting methods are then available to esti-
mate these parameters from observed data, as well as
to compare and select from a variety of possible models.
For instance, as described in the citations above, onecan posit a Dirichlet process prior model for commu-
nity structure wherein the generative model captures:
(a) an endogenous number of communities; (b) a dis-
tribution on the propensity of linking to items in other
communities (and in the same community), conditioned
on a particular community assignment; and (c) links be-
tween items given a model for linking propensity. Not
only does such a scheme enable principled inference pro-
cedures that can also be extended to model the dynamic
evolution of marketplaces and temporal dependencies
within them, it also provides a means of uncertainty
quantiﬁcation for the resultant parameter estimates, an
important consideration when scientiﬁc conclusions are
being drawn from the data under study.
Summary
In this paper we have collected behavioral data from
bidders in two eBay markets and from this data in-
ferred aggregate properties about bidder preferences.
The basic idea is that by their bidding behavior bid-
ders indicate “revealed preference” information; e.g.,
two goods are natural substitutes (when auctions are
part of a community in which bidders tend to win in
only one auction) or two goods are natural complements
(when auctions are part of a community then tend to
share winning bidders). Although current community
detection methods seem to be a reasonable tool we con-
sider much of this methodology ad hoc: which graph to
construct, how many communities to look for, how to
interpret the results? As a future direction we have ad-
vocated the combination of generative modeling with
Bayesian inference. We are currently pursuing this di-
rection on new data sets.
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